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ABSTRACT 
In an electronic auction protocol, the main participants are the seller, a set of trusted auctioneer(s) and the set of 
bidders. In this paper we consider the situation where there is a seller and a set of n bidders intending to come to an 
agreement on the selling price of a certain good. Full private or bidder-resolved auction means that this agreement is 
reached without the help of trusted parties or auctioneers. Therefore, only the seller and the set of bidders are 
involved, the role of the auctioneers becomes obsolete in this case. We propose a new – simple and secure – 
technique for the design of a full private sealed-bid auction protocol. We employ the well known mathematical 
proposition, the knapsack problem which was used by Merkle and Hellman [1] in the design of their asymmetric 
public-key knapsack trapdoor cryptosystem. Up to our knowledge, the knapsack problem has not been considered 
before in the design of electronic auctions. We also employ an efficient (1-out-of-k) oblivious transfer of strings for 
secure data transfer between the seller and the bidders (e.g., [2]). At the end of the protocol, the seller knows the set 
of prices selected by the bidders, yet he doesn't know which bid belongs to which bidder until the winning bidder 
announces himself and proves his case by opening a secret code corresponding to the highest price. Our protocol is a 
1
st
 price and automatically a 2
nd
 price auction as well, since the winning bidder can pay the 2
nd
 highest price – 
indicated by a flag –  according to the public auction predefined rules. We give the protocol for honest but curious 
participants then we show how to detect malicious behavior of the participants by employing a one way function 
with a suitable homomorphic property. 
 
Keywords: Electronic auction – Sealed-bid auction – Knapsack problem – Secret sharing – Oblivious transfer – 
Discrete logarithm problem. 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
Auctions become a major phenomenon in the field of electronic commerce. In an electronic auction, there is a seller 
that wants to sell a good; he defines a set of prices (several hundred tokens) for his good. There is a set of bidders 
who are willing to bid for this good; each bidder makes his selection for the price. At the end of the protocol, the 
bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the highest price or sometimes the second highest price 
according to the auction public rule of payment. Some properties must be satisfied by any auction protocol. Fast 
execution: this is a common desired property in any computer network protocol. Economic design: the auction must 
be designed on solid economic principles, the bidders have to bid as they truly value the item based on their own 
valuation or indifference price. Privacy: no information is revealed about any bidder's bid during or after the auction 
is completed, only the winning bidder and the corresponding selling price is known at the end of the protocol. 
Anonymity: no information is revealed about any bidder's identity, the protocol is completely anonymous until the 
winning bidder announces himself to the public or to the seller with a proof that he is the intended winner, and no 
information about the identity of the other bidders is revealed. At the end of our protocol, the seller knows the set of 
prices selected by the bidders yet he doesn’t know which price belongs to which bidder. Since no information is 
revealed about the identity of any bidder or his corresponding bid, privacy and anonymity are attained. 
Auctions can be classified into three main categories, these are: increasing price (English auction), decreasing price 
(Dutch auction) and sealed-bid auction. In an English auction, the good is offered at increasing prices. Initially, the 
good is offered at T tokens, in time slot i, it is offered at ( iT  ) tokens where   is a function of several factors 
such as the previous bids. This type of auction has several disadvantages, the time required to conduct the auction is 
proportional to the price at which the item is sold, and the communication costs may grow super linearly in the 
ultimate price at which the item is sold. This type of auction leaks enormous amount of information, an observer can 
deduce information about the price that each party is willing to pay for this good and hence; true valuation, privacy 
and anonymity are lost. Dutch auction is similar to the English auction except the way the price varies over time. In 
this case, the price decreases, that is, at time slot i, the good is offered at )( iT   tokens. The first bidder who is 
willing to bid wins the auction. Hence, this type of auction provides maximum privacy and anonymity. However, as 
in the case of English auction, it is time consuming. In a sealed-bid auction, each party sends a sealed bid to a trusted 
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auctioneer who opens all bids; the auctioneer sells the good to the bidder of the highest bid. The sealed-bid auction 
is very attractive, since, it can execute in one round of communication between the bidders and the auctioneers and 
hence it is very fast. However, the trusted auctioneers are its main disadvantage. Our protocol is a sealed-bid auction 
without the help of any auctioneers, that is, only the seller and the set of bidders are able to come to an agreement on 
the selling price. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we give a brief description of the related work in the field and the 
contributions of this paper. In section 3, we give a bird's eye view on our protocol. Section 4 presents the basic tools 
used in the protocol. Section 5 presents a concrete description of the protocol in the case of honest but curious 
participants to clarify the basic steps; also, we include a simple numerical illustrative example. Section 6 presents 
the full protocol to detect any malicious behavior attempted by the participants. 
 
2.    RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Franklin and Reiter [3] introduced the basic problem of sealed-bid auction but disregarded the privacy of bids after 
the auction is finished. Many secure auction protocols have been proposed, some of which are not suitable for the 
execution of a 2
nd
 price auction [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 35]. Another category of the work in this field is based on 
threshold cryptography and relies on the existence of a set of auctioneers where at most one third of them are not 
trusted [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Some of the proposed protocols rely on the existence of a third party that is not fully 
trusted. In [16, 17] the third party may not collude with any bidder, while in [18, 19] the third party and the 
auctioneers may collude. In [20, 21] there is a trusted third party that holds the key for a public-encryption 
algorithm. The recent work of Felix Brandt [22, 23, 24, 25] introduces a novel kind of secure and private auction 
where information is shared among bidders and only the seller and the set of bidders are incorporated in the 
protocol. In this paper we propose a protocol for electronic sealed-bid auction which is very simple with much lower 
complexity and satisfies full privacy and security. The protocol proposed in this paper satisfies the following 
properties: 
 Full privacy or bidder-resolved: There are no trusted parties or auctioneers involved in the protocol, only 
the seller and the set of bidders are involved and are able to come to an agreement on the selling price. 
 Private-bids: No information is revealed about any bidder's bid, at the end of the protocol the seller knows 
the set of prices chosen but he does not know which bid belongs to which bidder. 
 Anonymity: No information is revealed about the identity of any of the bidders until the winning bidder of 
the highest bid identifies himself to the seller and he is able to prove his case by opening his secret code 
corresponding to the highest bid. 
 Fast execution: Our protocol is a sealed-bid auction protocol; therefore, the protocol is fast compared to 
other protocols that depend on time slotted tokens such as English and Dutch auctions. Also, the novel 
attempt of employing the knapsack mathematical proposition speeds up the execution of the protocol over 
previous sealed-bid auction protocols. 
 Correctness: the winning bidder and the selling price are determined correctly. 
 Applicability: Our protocol applies to the 1st price and 2nd price auction as well. 
 
3.    THE OUTLINES OF OUR PROTOCOL 
There is a seller that wants to sell a good; he selects a set P of k prices (tokens) for this good where, P 
},...,{ 1 kpp  and arranges these prices in an ascending order. The seller also selects a set C of k super-increasing 
secret values, C  = },...,{ 1 kcc , 
*
qi Zc   where q is a large prime subject to the condition that  
k
i i
cq
1
. By the 
term 'super-increasing', we mean that 



1
1
i
j ji
cc  ),...,1( ki  . The seller selects a vector of n random and 
independent integers R = },...,{ 1 nrr  such that   
n
i i
qr
1
)(mod0 , *qi Zr  , which will be used to randomize the 
distribution of C. Each price ip  is assigned the secret code, ic . There is also a k-bit vector F },...,{ 1 kff  where, 
),...,1(}1,0{ kif i  , at the start of the protocol, ),...,1(0 kif i  .  
There is a set B of n bidders, B = },...,{ 1 nBB . Each bidder jB B secretly chooses a price jip  P  that he is 
willing to pay for this good. The seller interacts with each bidder jB  to secretly transfer the secret code 
qrcc jii jj mod  corresponding to the bidder's selected price jip . The seller must not know any information 
about the choice made by any of the bidders. Also, any bidder must not know any information about any secret code 
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other than the one corresponding to his chosen price. Our solution to this problem is the employment of a secure 
1
kOT  oblivious transfer of strings.  
After each bidder possesses the secret code corresponding to his chosen price, the bidders – jointly and securely – 
compute the sum of the secret codes they have and delivers the result to the seller, we must satisfy that no bidder 
knows any information about any other bidder's bid (secret code). Also, the seller must not know which bid belongs 
to which bidder. This can be achieved through a trivial additive joint secret sharing scheme. Simply, each bidder 
splits his secret code into n additive shares and privately sends a share to each other bidder. Each bidder then sums 
what he has and the result is delivered to the seller. The seller, by his role, sums what he receives from the bidders to 
compute the knapsack value and starts to solve the knapsack problem for the value he receives from the bidders to 
determine the set of flags, F. As a result of the solution of the knapsack problem, the flag if  is set to one if and only 
if the corresponding price ip  was selected by one of the bidders, the seller is able to know the set P`  P of the 
selected prices, yet, he still does not know which bidder selected which price. The seller then publishes the winning 
price (bid). The bidder of the highest price announces himself or identifies himself to the seller and proves his case 
by opening the secret code corresponding to the highest price in the set P`. 
 
4.    OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC TOOLS 
In this section we introduce a brief overview of the underlying primitives used in our auction protocol. 
 
4.1. Oblivious transfer 
Rabin [26] proposed the concept of oblivious transfer (OT) in the cryptographic scenario. In this case The sender 
(seller) has only one secret bit m and would like to have the receiver (buyer) to get it with probability 1/2, on the 
other hand, the receiver does not want the sender to know whether it gets m or not. For 
1
2OT , the sender has two 
secrets 1m  and 2m , the receiver will get one of them at the receiver's choice. The receiver does not want the sender 
to know which bit he chooses and the receiver must not know any information other than what he has chosen. 
1
kOT  
is a natural extension of the 
1
2OT  to the case of k secrets. However, constructing 
1
kOT  from 
1
2OT  is not a trivial 
problem. 
1
kOT  is also known as "All or nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)" [27, 28, 29, 30]. Oblivious 
transfers is a fundamental primitive in many cryptographic applications and secure distributed computations and has 
many applications such as private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure 
computation, etc. [31, 32]. In our auction protocol we will employ an efficient 
1
kOT  oblivious transfer of strings 
[e.g. 2]. 
 
4.2. The Knapsack problem 
The knapsack problem is a mathematically attractive proposition for cryptography. Merkle and Hellman public-key 
asymmetric cryptosystem [1] was based on the trapdoor knapsack problem. Assume a key ),...,( 1 kkK   where 
the ik 's are integers and   is the plaintext bit length. Let ),...,( 1 xxX   be the plaintext where, 
}1,0{ix ),...,1( i . Then the knapsack cryptosystem encrypts the plaintext X  according to the formula: 
 

1i ii
xkXKY . The calculation of Y from X and K is simple, while the recovery of X from Y and K 
involves solving a knapsack problem and is generally difficult when K is randomly chosen. If the key K is chosen at 
random but also is chosen such that each element of K is larger than the sum of the preceding elements, the 
corresponding knapsack problem becomes very simple. That is, if  



1
1
i
j ji
kk ),...,1( i , the ciphertext  can 
be generated as  

 1j jj
xky . The plaintext X can be recovered from the key K and the ciphertext 

y  
according to the following procedure: If  ky  , then set 0x  and  yy 1 . If  ky  , then set 1x  and 
 kyy 1 . Using the computed value of 1y , the values 1x  and 2y  can be found in a similar fashion. 
The process continues until the whole X is recovered. Our auction protocol will rely mainly on the knapsack 
problem. 
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4.3. Proof of equality of discrete logarithms 
Given two large primes p and q such that 1| pq , qG  is the unique multiplicative subgroup of pZ  with order q. 
qGgg 21 , . Alice and Bob knows 21,,, ggwv  but only Alice knows x where 
xgv 1  and 
xgw 2 . The proof of 
equality of the exponents is as follows: 
 Alice chooses z at random and sends 
zgA 1  and 
zgB 2  to Bob. 
 Bob chooses a challenge c at random and sends it to Alice. 
 Alice sends qcxzr mod)(   to Bob. 
Bob checks that 
cr Avg 1  and 
cr Bvg 2 . 
 
5.    OUR KNAPSACK AUCTION PROTOCOL FOR HONEST PARTICIPANTS 
In this section we give a concrete description of the proposed auction protocol when the participants (the seller and 
the bidders) incorporated in the protocol are honest but curious. The term 'honest' means that all the participants 
execute the steps of the protocol correctly and honestly. The term 'curious" means that the participants are willing to 
view any secret information leaked during the execution of the protocol but they do not deviate from the correct 
execution. This is equivalent to the eavesdropping adversary model. An eavesdropping adversary watches and learns 
all the information transferred to and from the corrupted participant but does not prevent him from contributing in 
the protocol correctly. In the described protocol, we will assume that each bidder makes a bid different from any 
other bidder, that is, all bids are distinct. Soon, and after describing the tie-free auction protocol, we will show how 
to detect a tie between two or more bidders. The tie-free auction protocol is given in the following subsection. 
 
5.1. The detailed description of the protocol 
Initialization by the seller: 
 A good G and its set of prices, P = },...,{ 1 kpp  where ji pp  ji   (ascending order). 
 The seller defines a set of k super-increasing random integers, C = },...,{ 1 kcc  where 




1
1
i
j ji
cc ),...,1( ki  . He assigns 
i
c  to the price value 
i
p . 
 The seller selects a set of n random and large randomizing integers R = },...,{ 1 nrr  such that 
  
n
i i
qr
1
mod0    ),...,1(* niZr qi   where q is a large prime and  
k
i i
cq
1
. 
 The seller defines a vector of k flags, F = },...,{ 1 kff  where }1,0{if  and initially, ),...,1(0 kif i  . 
Choices made by the bidders (distinct bids): 
 Each bidder, jB ),...,1( nj   secretly chooses a price index )( ji  corresponding to his selected price, 
ji
p . 
Oblivious transfer of the chosen price secret code: 
 Each bidder jB  interacts with the seller in an 
1
kOT  oblivious transfer of strings to receive the secret 
randomized code, qrcc jii jj mod  corresponding to his chosen price among the set of codes, C j = 
}mod,...,mod{ 1 qrcqrc jkj  . 
Additive sharing of the secret codes: 
 Each bidder jB  splits his secret code, jic
  into n random values, vjd ,  such that,  
n
v vji
dc
j 1 ,
. This is 
spoken off as split knowledge. 
 Each bidder jB  privately sends vjd ,  to bidder vB ),...,1( nv  . 
 Each Bidder jB  sums what he has from the other bidders to compute the additive share,  
n
v jvj
d
1 ,
  
and secretly sends j  to the seller. 
 The seller collects the additive shares from the bidders to compute k . 
Solving the knapsack problem by the seller: 
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 The seller computes the knapsack value, q
n
i ik
mod
1   . 
 If kk c , then set 0kf  and kk  1 . If kk c , then set 1kf  and kkk c  1 . 
 Using the computed value of 1k , the seller sets 1kf  and computes 2k  in a way similar to the 
previous step. 
 The seller continues solving the knapsack problem until all the states of the flags in F are determined. 
Announcing the winning bidder: 
 The seller broadcasts the highest price indicated by the vector F which contains the flags corresponding to 
the prices P` chosen by the bidders. 
 The seller requests the winning bidder (holding the secret code corresponding to the highest price) to 
identify himself. 
 The winning bidder proves his case to the seller by showing the secret code he holds. 
 
Although we described the protocol as a 1
st
 price auction, one may notice that the protocol is automatically a 2
nd
 
price auction since the winning bidder can pay the 2
nd
 highest price indicated by the flags vector, F. 
 
5.2. Simple numerical illustrative example 
We will give a simple example at a medium level of details to illustrate the basic operations and computations. We 
will not describe the lower level details. The parameters are chosen strictly for simplicity of the example. 
Consider a seller offering a good G for 8 bidding prices, P = {10$, 20$, 30$, 40$, 50$, 60$, 70$, 80$}. He 
chooses 8 super-increasing secret random integers in 
*
qZ , C = {3, 5, 10, 21, 40, 90, 180, 360}. Choose the prime q as 
709)751( q . The seller chooses 4 random and independent integers in *qZ  and sets the vector R = {700, 100, 
200, 502} satisfying, 700 + +100 + 200 + 502   0 mod 751. 
There are 4 bidders B = },,,{ 4321 BBBB  willing to bid for G, each bidder makes his bid. Assume that the 
following bids are made: $80$,40$,10$,30 4321  BBBB . The seller interact with each bidder 
through an 
1
8OT -oblivious transfer of strings to securely transfer the randomized secret code corresponding to the 
bidder's selected price index. As a result, each bidder possesses a randomized secret code corresponding to his 
selected price, that is, 
 
,751mod107007101 B  
,751mod10031032 B  
,751mod212002213 B  
751mod5023601114 B . 
 
Each bidder splits his secret code into 4 random additive shares,  
 
10200400100710:1 B ,  
3405010103:2 B ,  
21950150221:3 B , 
11353530111:4 B . 
 
Each bidder receives a share from each other bidder and computes his additive share of 
8
  as: 
 
2903015010100: 11 B , 
535355050400: 22 B , 
294351940200: 33 B , 
26112310: 44 B . 
 
IJRRAS 9 (2) ● November 2011 Ibrahim ● Approach to Fully Private and Secure Auction 
 
 
 
265 
 
Each bidder jB  sends his additive share j  to the seller. The seller computes the knapsack value, 
394751mod)26294535290(8  . 
 
The seller starts solving the knapsack problem and sets the set of flags F. Given C = {3, 5, 10, 21, 40, 90, 180, 360} 
and 3948  . The seller proceeds as follows: 
 
34360394,1 887888  cfc  ; 
34,0),,( 76545675677   fffccc ; 
132134,1 443444  cfc  ; 
31013,1 332333  cfc  ; 
1,50,0 121222  ffc  . 
 
Finally the seller sets F = }1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1{  and announces the highest price as 80$. The winning bidder 4B  
identifies himself to the seller and proves his case by showing the secret code, 710 to the seller, the winning bidder 
4B  can pay the second highest price indicated by the flags which is 40$ when the auction is a 2
nd
 price auction. 
 
6.    OUR KNAPSACK AUCTION PROTOCOL FOR MALICIOUS PARTICIPANTS 
Since the participants of the auction protocol are malicious, the first thing that comes to mind is that each participant 
must be committed to the values he selects, possesses or computes during the execution of the auction protocol in 
order to detect any attempt to manipulate or tamper with these values. As in most multiparty computation protocols 
a one way function with a suitable homomorphic property is required. Feldman in [33] used a one way function 
based on the discrete log problem. The main objective of Feldman was to add verifiability property to the well know 
Shamir's secret sharing scheme [34]. Let p and q be two large prime numbers such that 1p q   or in other 
words )1(| pq  where   is a small integer. Let g be an element of 
p
Z  and of order q such that for each 
i
x  there 
is a public value pgy i
x
i
mod . Let 
t
aa ,...,
0
 be the coefficients of Shamir's t-degree polynomial f where, 
xa 
0
 is the secret. The dealer broadcasts t
aaxa gggg ,...,, 10  . Each player 
i
P  can check the validity of his share 
i
x  by checking that, pgggg
t
ti iaiaax mod)...())(( 10 . Similar verification can be done during the reconstruction 
of the secret key to verify the validity of the submitted shares. 
 
6.1. The detailed description of the protocol 
In our auction protocol, we need two generators: sg  which is used to commit the seller to the selected secret codes, 
and bg  which is used to commit the bidders to their selected random values. Part of the protocol requires that the 
values published by the bidders must be away from the view of the seller. This can be achieved by many ways, for 
example, the bidders agree on a common secret key for a symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., DES) and use this 
secret key to hide the published quantities from the seller. The auction protocol is as follows: 
 
 Initialization by the seller: 
 A good G and its set of prices, P = },...,{ 1 kpp  where ji pp  ji   (ascending order). 
 The seller defines a set of k super-increasing random integers, C = },...,{ 1 kcc  where 




1
1
i
j ji
cc ),...,1( ki  . He assigns the secret code ic  to the price value ip . 
 The seller selects a set of n random and large randomizing integers R = },...,{ 1 nrr  such that 
  
n
i i
qr
1
mod0    ),...,1(* niZr qi   where q is a large prime and  
k
i i
cq
1
. 
 The seller defines a vector of k flags, F = },...,{ 1 kff  where }1,0{if  and initially, ),...,1(0 kif i  . 
 The seller publishes i
c
si g ),...,1( ki   and 
ir
si g ),...,1( ni  . 
 
 
IJRRAS 9 (2) ● November 2011 Ibrahim ● Approach to Fully Private and Secure Auction 
 
 
 
266 
 
Choices made by the bidders: 
 Each bidder, jB ),...,1( nj   secretly chooses a price index )( ji  corresponding to his selected price 
ji
p . 
 
Oblivious transfer and verification of the chosen price's secret code: 
 Each bidder jB  interacts with the seller in an 
1
kOT  oblivious transfer of strings to receive the secret code 
ji
c  corresponding to his chosen price. 
 Each bidder jB  verifies that the secret code he received from the seller is a valid code and corresponds to 
his index value by checking that, j
ic
sji g

 . 
 If the equality in the previous step does not hold, the bidder jB  broadcasts a rejection, jREJ . Else, he 
broadcasts an acceptance, jACC  and he cannot – later –repudiate the correct reception of the secret 
code. 
 
Committing the bidders to their chosen secret codes: 
 Away from the view of the seller, each bidder jB  publishes a commitment to his secret code as 
ji
c
bj g

 . 
 
Proof 1: In the previous step, it is possible that a bidder lies and publishes a commitment unrelated to his secret 
code. Hence, it is required to prove that each published value ),...,1( njj   is valid (i.e. the exponent of bg  is a 
valid secret code). The seller helps in this proof as follows: 
 The seller computes the quantities k
c
b
c
b gg ,...,
1  and publishes them in a random order. Also he publishes 
jr
bg ),...,1( nj   so that any bidder is able to compute 
ji
c
bg

 for any ji, . 
 The bidders verify that each commitment value ),...,1( njj   equal to one of the quantities published 
by the seller in the previous step. 
  
Verifiable Additive sharing of the secret codes: 
In this part of the auction protocol, any quantities published by the bidders are away from the view of the seller 
unless otherwise stated. The protocol proceeds as follows: 
 Each bidder jB  splits his secret code, jic
  into n random values, vjd ,  such that,  
n
v vji
dc
j 1 ,
. He also 
publishes the commitments vj
d
bg
, ),...,1( nv . 
 Each bidder jB  privately sends vjd ,  to bidder vB ),...,1( nv  . 
 Each bidder jB  verifies the validity of what he receives from every other bidder vB  by checking the 
commitments. jB  broadcasts 
)(v
jACC  if he accepts the share, otherwise, he broadcasts 
)(v
jREJ . 
 After bad bidders are disqualified, each bidder jB  sums what he has to compute his additive share j . 
 Each bidder jB  publishes 
j
bg

 (the seller views these quantities). It is obvious that the bidders can verify 
the validity of every published value, 
j
bg

. 
 Each bidder jB  secretly delivers j  to the seller. 
 
Verifying the knapsack quantity and solving the knapsack problem by the seller: 
 The seller checks the validity of the received additive shares n ,...,1  by checking that 
j
bg

's are valid 
and matches the published commitments by the bidders. 
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 The seller safely computes the knapsack quantity, q
n
i ik
mod
1   . 
 The seller starts solving the knapsack problem and sets the vector F. 
 The seller announces the highest bid. 
 
 Announcing the winning bidder: 
 The seller requests the winning bidder (holding the secret code corresponding to the highest price) to 
identify himself. 
 The winning bidder proves his case to the seller by showing the secret code he holds. 
 
Proof 2: It is possible that the seller lies about the set of flags he broadcasted especially when the auction is a 2
nd
 
price payment, since he can lie about the 2
nd
 highest price by increasing its amount and setting a wrong flag. It is 
required a proof that all the broadcasted flags are correct. To prove this, notice that: kii s
k
i
fc
s gg
 1 . Also the 
participants know ki b
n
i b
gg
  1 . The seller is asked to prove to the winning bidder that the exponent of 
 
k
i
fc
s
iigA
1
 is equal to the exponent of  
n
i b
igB
1

. The proof is as follows: 
 The seller chooses a random value 
*
qZz  and privately sends 
z
b
z
s gg ,  to the winning bidder  
 The winning bidder chooses a challenge 
*
qZ  at random and sends it to the seller. 
 The seller sends qzr k mod)(   to the winning bidder. 
 The winning bidder checks that, 
Agg zs
r
s   and 
Bgg zb
r
b  . 
 
6.2. Tie detection and breaking 
We described the auction protocol assuming that the bidders make distinct bids. However, if two or more bidders 
selected the same price ip , they will be assigned the same value, ic  and consequently, at the end of the protocol the 
seller will not be able to solve the knapsack problem correctly. Therefore, the bidders must be able to detect a tie 
before computing the additive shares of the knapsack value k . Recall that each bidder jB  has published the 
commitments, 
ji
c
bg

. If the seller publishes the values 
jr
bg

),...,1( nj   then the bidders are able to compute 
jjiji r
b
c
b
c
b ggg

 ),...,1( nj  . Hence, the bidders are able to detect a tie and solve it. 
 
6.3. Notes on halted or disqualified bidders 
It is possible that one or more bidders are halted, disconnected or disqualified due to the detection of malicious 
behavior. In this case we have three situations: 
 
 A bidder is halted before the oblivious transfer of the secret code. 
 A bidder is halted after transferring the secret code but before the additive secret sharing. 
 A bidder is halted after the sharing of the secret codes. 
 
In the first situation, the seller simply discards the random value in R corresponding to the halted bidder(s) and 
continues the execution of the protocol with the remaining bidders. In the second situation, the bids made by the 
halted bidder(s) are discarded. In the third situation, the bidders must re-share the secret code they have among the 
remaining bidders. 
In our protocol we employed a trivial Joint additive secret sharing which represents an ),1( nn  -threshold secret 
sharing where the threshold is 1 nt . Shamir's ),( nt -secret sharing scheme of [34] can be employed in order to 
avoid the re-sharing of the secret codes when a number no more than )1(  tn  bidders are halted. However, the 
protocol in this case cannot withstand the collusion of more than t malicious bidders, since it is possible that a bidder 
has many agents that work for him. 
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6.    AN OPEN PROBLEM 
As a way to improve privacy to the maximum, it would be nice if it is possible to let the seller solves the knapsack 
problem only for the highest price in the case of a 1
st
 price auction or for the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 highest prices in the case of a 
2
nd
 price auction and hides all the rest of the bids from the seller and at the same time enables the detection of a lying 
seller. Our protocol hides the correspondence of the bids, since the seller is not able to know which bid belongs to 
which bidder. 
 
7.    CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we introduced a novel technique for electronic sealed-bid auction by employing the well known 
mathematical proposition, the knapsack problem to enable the seller to solve for the bids made by the bidders 
without having any information about which bid belongs to which bidder, therefore, the protocol is private and 
anonymous, the identity and the corresponding bids of the bidders – except the winning bidder – are kept unknown. 
The protocol is simple and of efficient execution time and data transfer complexity over previous protocols. The 
protocol does not involve any trusted parties or auctioneers. Only the seller and the set of bidders are able to come to 
an agreement on the selling price. We have shown the complete description of the protocol in the case of honest but 
curious participants, also, we have shown the protocol to detect malicious behavior of the participants. Our protocol 
is a 1
st
 price and a 2
nd
 price auction since the winning bidder can simply pay the 2
nd
 highest price indicated by the 
corresponding flag. We have shown also how a tie can be detected by the bidders. 
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